Abstract-As part of the Jefferson Lab 12 GeV accelerator upgrade project, Hall B requires two conduction cooled superconducting magnets. One is a magnet system consisting of six superconducting trapezoidal racetrack-type coils assembled in a toroidal configuration and the second is an actively shielded solenoidal magnet system consisting of five coils. Both magnets are to be wound with Superconducting Super Collider-36 NbTi strand Rutherford cable soldered into a copper channel. This paper describes This paper describes a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) that was done on these magnets to identify their various failure modes, which were assessed in terms of their Risk Priority Numbers (RPN). Mitigating actions were identified that would reduce the RPNs to acceptable values.
I. INTRODUCTION

A S PART OF THE Jefferson Lab 12
GeV accelerator upgrade project [1] , Hall B requires two conduction cooled superconducting magnets [2] as parts of the Large Acceptance Spectrometer (CLAS12) Experiment. One of the magnets, the torus magnet system was subjected to a detailed Risk Assessment and Mitigation (RAM) process. The process was used to evaluate the overall magnet design and the robustness of its protection system. The magnet risk analysis includes electromagnetic (EM) analysis with eddy currents, Lorentz forces, thermal loading, and interaction with the superconducting solenoid, which is located in close proximity to the torus. In order to evaluate the RAM, the FMEA tool was employed to assess the risks and develop mitigating actions to reduce them.
The Torus magnet is comprised of 6 identical superconducting trapezoidal racetrack-type coils, electrically connected in series. Each coil is wound using surplus, 36 strand, bare NbTi Rutherford cable from the Superconducting Super Collider dipole, originally intended for its outer shell [3] . JLab is soldering the cable into a copper channel and insulating it. The resulting conductor is wound and potted within an aluminum coil case. The main parameters of the torus and solenoid magnets are listed in Table I . The torus magnet system includes the following integral partsa) A thermo syphon based 4.5 K heat exchanger system "re-cools" a single stream of forced flow, supercritical helium before it traverses through each coil. Six individual re-coolers are used. This supercritical helium stream provides indirect cooling to the superconducting magnet coil's conductor edges through two spirals of copper tubing connected to copper cooling fins. Similar arrangements cool bus-lines and part of the transport current leads. b) Conductor splices cooled via the exterior surface of the six re-coolers. c) Liquid Nitrogen cooled shields and supports that suspend the coils in space. d) Transport current leads in a vacuum insulated transfer line from the magnet system to the somewhat remote cryo service tower. e) Instrumentation feed-through systems from the cryo service tower helium volume to the magnet insulating vacuum f) Magnet power supply and quench protection system (QPS) g) Magnet diagnostic system (MDS) associated with the control and data acquisition system h) Electrical, compressed air and deionized water systems.
Samples of all components related to the magnet system (NbTi strands, cables, conductors, coils, potting, joints/splices, current leads, and insulation breaks) were tested or are in the process of being tested at various test facilities, both in the USA and abroad.
The MDS is used to monitor and display the status of the magnet and the vapor cooled and conduction cooled current leads during cool down, operation and warm up. The MDS 1051-8223 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. includes a hardwired interlock safety system that will protect both magnet systems in the event of various fault scenarios. A reliable, tried [4] and tested quench detection and protection circuit is also part of the MDS.
II. FMEA PROCESS
FMEA is a tool used to eliminate or mitigate known potential failures, problems, and errors from systems. A failure mode is defined as the way a component could fail to meet its performance requirements or to function.
The potential failure modes are evaluated based on the Risk Priority Number (RPN) which is the product of three factors: the Severity ranking (S), the probability of Occurrence (O), and the probability of Detection (D). The RPN is used as a measure of overall risk and helps to identify and rank the risks of the potential failure modes based on three criteria [5] - [7] .
These RPNs indicate that some failure types could be perceived to be "worse" than others, but give no quantitative indication of their relative effects as a statistical measure for analysis. Larger RPNs indicate the need for corrective action or failure resolution. The most critical system or component failures are those that have escaped the design reviews and inhouse quality inspections and could be expected to be found later during commissioning and operations within the experimental hall. The end results of failures that lead to unsafe conditions or significant losses in functionality are rated high in severity. The FMEA process is used to assist in identifying potential failure modes early in the design phase. An example of one analysis triggered by the FMEA was an investigation into the electromagnetic interaction between the torus and the solenoid under various operational and failure modes [8] .
At JLab, we started by first identifying the potential failure modes (with cause of the failure) and the effect on the torus magnet system. A small sampling of the identified failure modes is presented in Table II for Instrumentation and Controls. Each failure mode was given a unique identifying number and grouped according to where the failure mode could be instigated and first mitigated. At JLAB these categories are (1) Overall Mechanical Design, (2) Coil Manufacturing, (3) Magnet Factory, (4) Hall Installation, (5) Commissioning, and (6) Instrumentation and Controls. Each failure mode and effect was then assigned a Severity Ranking number (S) as defined in Table III . Severity is typically defined as the seriousness of the potential "end effects" and is assessed independently of the causes.
We then assigned the potential cause and evaluated the Probability of Occurrence (P) ranking number as defined in Table IV . This was an estimation of how frequently the specific failure was projected to occur. The product of S times O gives a MIT value with larger values indicating failure modes that may require more attention.
We then identified the mitigation, action or control required and the current planned process control to be used to limit or prevent each failure mode. A Detection Probability (D) score was generated for each failure mode with and without the Table IV . The Detection Probability scores are generated on the basis of likelihood of mitigation before the issue became a failure or detection before it has significant consequence.
We then judged our ability to mitigate or detect these modes. A Risk-After-Mitigation RPN was generated from the product of the three values S, O and D. The Failure Modes were grouped into three levels by these RPNs: low risk <30, moderate risk <100 and high risk ≥100. As a convenient highlight, we used the conditional formatting feature of the FMEA work-sheet to automatically color code the RPN Fields to green, yellow and red respectively.
We also judged an Inaction Rating using a similar process assuming no mitigations or detections were employed. This provides the unmitigated RPNs shown in the last column. The sample of our FMEA in Table II shows the three failure modes at the top of the list that had the highest ranking, unmitigated RPNs for Instrumentation and Controls.
The mitigation and corrective actions plans can be classified into four basic groups-Design solutions, detecting causes, providing diagnostics and setting up monitoring and control mechanisms.
At the present stage of the project, the FMEA process is limited to failure mitigation from a technical perspective, driving designs that achieve the required performance specifications and safe operation of the magnet system. A list of corrective actions and failure resolutions leads to the following classifications:
1. Design solutions to eliminate the failure mode or reduce its likelihood, including: functional redundancies and error proofing the assembly, installation and usage. 2. Developing means of detecting causes of failure modes during manufacturing including: inspection, testing, and error proofing. 3. Providing diagnostics to easily identify the failure mode or cause during manufacture or operation. 4. Setting up monitoring and control mechanisms (e.g., interlocks) to prevent catastrophic failure during operation.
Independent cost base analysis was also carried out to mitigate high risk items but is too wide a subject to be presented in this paper.
This FMEA analysis has led to the establishment of a structured monitoring and controls procedure that will be used during the commissioning phase for the magnets and addresses the failures that may have escaped earlier mitigation.
The FMEA items associated with Instrumentation and Controls were then assessed for their likelihood to be mitigated by the following areas: magnet system diagnostics, safety interlock system, and quench detection & protection. These areas are discussed in the following sections.
III. MAGNET SYSTEM DIAGNOSIS
The torus magnet diagnosis system uses a PLC-based real-time/multiplexed industrial computer system for system control (PLC control) and a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based system for real time Data Acquisition (DAQ). A Laboratory Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System (EPICS) connection will be established via the local network which will enable experimental data to be acquired in real time and may be interrogated in real time. The server also communicates with other computers (e.g. End Station Refrigerator) by means of a fiber optic site network and the data will be processed on monitor computers during operation and experiments.
The inventory of data channels presently envisaged for the Hall B magnets (torus and solenoid) includes: channels for liquid helium (LHe) temperatures, 80 K shield temperatures, strain gauges, voltage taps, load cells, vacuum levels, and channels for the central interlock safety system. These channels include: pressures, pressure drops, liquid levels, mass flows, vacuum levels, voltages, strains and displacements.
The torus magnet diagnostic monitor and control system will serve multiple roles: a. Monitoring all the technical diagnostic signals from magnets, magnet lead bus bar and vapor cooled current leads for operation and safety control. b. Detecting magnet quench (signature), lead quench, splice quench, transport current lead section quench, and protective actions.
The torus and solenoid superconducting magnets are conduction cooled and, as a result, the slow thermal response could be a potential mode of failure and requires detailed engineering to make the magnet subsystem robust and reliable. Both Hall B magnets possess low levels of Minimum Quench Energy (MQE) compared to bath cooled magnets and to mitigate this, sufficient operating margin in terms of temperature and short sample limit (SSL) was applied to the design. As a snapshot, process of FMEA suggested designing the stabilizer in the bus and splice section to be quench-tolerant. The FMEA also led to not compromising on the detection threshold voltage (say we are tempted to increase the threshold from 100 mV to 150 mV while commissioning). The FMEA also led to setting the sampling rate for fast DAQ of quench voltages at a minimum of 1.5 kHz. This high frequency requirement forced the use of Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based firmware for the fast DAQ.
IV. DESIGN OF SAFETY INTERLOCK SYSTEM
The interlock safety system as shown in Fig. 1 , plays a vital role of magnet safety during commissioning and operation that links through magnet process control, PSU & alarm, QPS, the vacuum system, and the cryogenic system. An interlock safety system and independent magnet protection system based on the threshold limits will be active at all times-linked directly to serious failures.
A. Faults
The key risks for the torus/solenoid identified in the FMEA are as follows: a. The system does not satisfy the physics requirements. b. Defects in the build and manufacture of insulation. c. Helium mass flow in the cooling channel. d. Vacuum vessel cannot maintain required vacuum. e. Electrical insulation of magnet system. f. Magnet power supply system loses control. g. A fault in the quench detection and protection system prevents the magnet from being protected normally. Faults can be divided into 3 categories. Each category may require different actions:
1. Primary fault: Serious fault. If this fault occurs, the control system fail/shuts off and the magnetic system starts fast-ramp-down protection. 2. Secondary fault: If this fault happens, the magnet system starts slow-ramp-down protection. 3. Subsystem fault: System control or monitor function is not executed correctly when faults happen to any subsystem software and/or hardware device. For example, say the helium flow or pressure would be at fault. This will be the part of secondary fault case because the available cooling power will be limited and as a consequence the magnet will have a reduced margin. The design requires a temperature margin of 1.5 K at full operating current. Therefore we have to establish the operating regime while commissioning the magnet in steps.
Second, say electrical insulation within the coil or through to the transport current lead to the magnet power supply is compromised (Fault e). This is a primary fault case. Mitigation includes Hi pot tests and leakage current tests at predefined stages. The tests are identified along the process, through coil manufacturing, liquid nitrogen cold test, and coil assembly. As a result of the FMEA, leakage current monitors are incorporated as part of the protection schematic at a number of locations.
Safety polling signals are envisaged under different fault categories and shall execute different signal detection mechanisms for different signals. Voltage thresholds will be different based on the type of signal and its function. The voltage across the coil with splice and with voltage across splice alone will have different thresholds. Similarly, vapor cooled current leads in liquid helium and transport current bus leads from the cryo service can housing to the coil will be different. The voltage signals for temperature read out will have appropriately different sampling frequency compared to the voltage signals across the coil and transport current path that are meant to capture a quench event.
B. Design of Safety Interlock
The Hall B magnet safety interlock system is a distributed system that consists of, discharge process control, operating monitor, safety polling sub-system and access control system.
Polling of each safety parameter is performed by every control sub-system. Control subsystems closely related to devices, like the vacuum, magnet diagnostic, and cryogenic, will detect based on predefined safety parameters to determine whether device faults exist or not.
Each subsystem executes fault protection by analyzing a predefined parameter to judge the operating status of the system. These systems shall send control signals to related devices as soon as they detect faults. The system then starts any defined fault measures and immediately sends fault signals to the safety polling system. The safety polling system will decipher signals sent by subsystems and decide whether or not to notify operators and execute protections.
V. QUENCH DETECTION AND PROTECTION
The logic circuit for the quench detection system is developed based on a quench analysis concentrating on magnet protection [9] . In the event of a quench, the protection system is triggered and the discharging process is initiated based on the category of fault defined earlier. The protection is designed to utilize both fast discharge and controlled ramp down, based on the fault category. Once the set threshold in the quench detector is reached, the hardwired protection will initiate the fast discharge. In all other cases, before the threshold is reached, the control & interlock logic will initiate based on the predefined decision process. At the same time, the voltage signals are sent to the data acquisition system and the central control system for analysis of the cause of the quench.
As an outcome of the FMEA process, a few critical actions are identified-vacuum leak test, defining number of temperature sensors with location, current leakage monitoring, electrical insulation test at room temperature and low temperature, quench detection, defining the voltage tap location, redundancy over the voltage taps and fixing the voltage taps to the source, and even quench protection against incorrect protection where quench detection signals were sent incorrectly to the detection system.
VI. CONCLUSION
A systematic approach was put together to identify the potential failures and their risks involved in the overall magnet system. Those failures and risks could arise from design, manufacturing, and assembly, and could potentially affect magnet performance. Upon carrying out the FMEA, the failure modes were scored as being high, moderate or low risk. Appropriate measures were identified that mitigated the issues. The FMEA was a quantitative risk assessment exercise that helped to address the level of the risks using an RPN, and this allowed the mitigating response for every evaluated failure mode to be prioritized.
